Understanding the Civil War in Syria: Yes, it's complicated.

 Following the death of the Prophet Muhammad in AD 632, the issue of who was going to succeed him—not as a prophet, but as a 'Caliph,' or leader of the Muslim Ummah—grew from a simple disagreement into a full-on schism. Soon enough, both sides had blood on their hands, and neither could realistically claim a lesser responsibility for the crisis, though both often tried. Despite a passionate assertion that God's final Prophet had given humankind its 'Final Revelation,' the fractalizing movement of history pressed onward to prove that ultimately nothing had changed.

That there could be such a radical schism in Islam at such an early stage in its development seems to spell out how 'average' it is in relation to other religions, and how fractured of an organization it was destined to become from the outset.

All previous historical examples aside, we can see the bitter Sunni-Shiite divide play itself out in the arena of puritanical universalisms simply by observing the sectarian nature of the regional (now international) effort to fight ISIS and bring the nightmare of the Syrian Civil War to an end. In fact, you can almost (emphasis on 'almost' as it's not as cut and dry as some may imagine it to be) even schematize who's on which side by dividing them into their own religiously sectarian camps.

For example: President Bashar al-Assad, the calculated dictator who still attempts to thrive on a Soviet-style cult of personality just as his father Hafez did, hails from the Alawite sect, an obscure branch of Shia Islam. Essentially, they agree with mainstream Shia Islam in believing that Muhammad's son-in-law, Ali ibn Abi Talib (Ali for short) was the first Imam (excluding the Prophet himself), and the rightful heir to the leadership of the Ummah (Muslim community). Shiism's dramatic split with Sunni Islam boils down to the problem of succession, where Shiism and its offshoots believe that Ali and his descendants, as the closest blood relatives to the Prophet, should be leading Islam on this hereditary basis. Sunni Islam, on the other hand, believes (by and large) that the leader(s) of Islam should be chosen by consensus. When Muhammad died, Sunni's took his father-in-law Abu Bakr (or Abdullah ibn Abi Qhuhafah, though no native English speaker has an easy time trying to pronounce his full name) to be the first Caliph as he was preferred by said 'consensus.' They did not believe that the Prophet intended for his succession to be based on the spiritually esoteric prerequisite of blood relations.

Over the course of the next 1,380 years, many smaller schisms have occurred within the two main traditions, creating a fractalizing landscape of conflicting religious doctrine and myth that often leads to more tension than attempts at religious pluralism. Bashar al-Assad's native Alawite sect, as one of many offshoots to mainstream Shiism, has a long history of keeping its beliefs a very closely guarded secret, thus leading to many accusations of occult practice (usually on partisan grounds) and the formulation of elaborate conspiracy theories by those not involved in this Freemason-esque organization. It doesn't help that the Alawites make up only 12% of the entire Syrian population, and are thus perceived as a gilded minority ruling over a fractured and oppressed majority. Since the year 2000, however, advances have been made in deciphering some of the beliefs central to the Alawis, such as the core of the religion being based around a divine triad which comprises of three aspects of one God that cyclically emanate in human form throughout the course of history. The last eminent expressions of this divine triad, in Alawite belief, were Ali, Muhammad, and Salman the Persian (one of the Prophets most loyal companions and the first Persian to convert to the new religion). For these beliefs—which are obtuse relative to the overall standard of Islam—Alawites have been persecuted. Under Ottoman rule, Alawites were brutally oppressed if they did not capitulate and convert to become Sunni. The Alawites rose up in armed revolt against the Ottoman's on multiple occasions, some of which ended in savage defeat, and others which ended in a tense calm during which the Alawites stepped away from world affairs, leaving the Turkish government alone in hopes of this being reciprocated. After the fall of the Ottoman Empire in the First World War and the formation of the French Mandate of Syria out of the Sykes-Picot Agreement, the Alawis, along with many other Syrians, were able to be recruited into the French armed forces for indefinite periods of time, and often didn't object as the French created small provisional states within the area for each minority population, including an Alawite State which was later dismantled but gave the Alawis key positions in both government and military.

Following a coup in 1949 (3 years following the end of the French Mandate of Syria and the withdrawal of French forces from the area), Alawites slowly consolidated their control of the state apparatus and, after 3 wars with Israel—each of which resulted in a humiliating defeat—Hafez al-Assad was able to maneuver his way up through the ranks of the now-ruling Baathist party to become its eventual dictatorial leader in 1970 after yet another coup. To his credit, he was able to reign in a relatively stable phase of political life in Syria, though mostly through the use of brutal repression and censorship of free speech. It's hard to say with any certainty what role Hafez's Alawite religion played in his 30 year tenure as President, but following his death and the inauguration of his son, Bashar, religion was—at the very least—being employed as a helpful rhetorical tool to inspire unquestioning allegiance as well as continue to elaborate on his cult of personality.

For example, in a 2011 speech to parliament in Damascus—during the outbreak of the Syrian Civil War—Bashar brazenly declared: “we’re reforming all the time. So anyone demanding more change must be an enemy. And we all know how our enemies are treated.” Similar statements followed, occasionally interjected with the so-called 'spontaneous' adoration of legislators who would cheer: “God, Syria and Bashar only,” followed by, “Our souls, our blood, we sacrifice for you.” This all culminated in a rather frightening final statement from a politician in the crowd, who endearingly screamed: “the Arab world is too small for you; you should govern the whole world, Mr President.” These statements, though not directly connected to Assad's religiosity, are as connected to his orthodox disposition as Mitt Romney utilizing God in his campaign rhetoric as a staunch believer in Mormonism.

By and large, genuine religious convictions on the part of Middle Eastern leaders is dependent on the country. For the most part, Syria has been ruled as a secular state. But when things started falling apart, the centrality of sectarianism in a geopolitical context highlighted how deeply-ingrained these divisions really were. Shia Iran immediately decided to support Assad's fledgling government; first with supplies, and later with direct (though undeclared) military intervention. This lent further impetus to the Gulf nations—represented under the umbrella of the Gulf Cooperation Council—to fund and arm the so-called 'moderate' Syrian opposition.

The Gulf Cooperation Council is made up of Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, Oman, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Saudi Arabia. What do these conservative monarchies have in common?

They each identify as Sunni.

There was even talk of them inducting Jordan and Morocco—both non-Gulf states, both Sunni—in some limited capacity, which was interpreted as their 'closing ranks' in the face of perceived proxy aggression on the part of Iran. And, with the rise of ISIS (the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria) followed by the groups' stunning military successes in northern Iraq and its subsequent declaration of an Islamic Caliphate—based on a historically utopian desire to return to the Rashidun Caliphate which was first ruled by Muhammad's father-in-law, Abu Bakr, and followed by 3 Caliphs (leaders) who are considered, in Sunni Islam, to be the four “Rightly Guided” Caliphs—Saudi Arabia was accused of having previously funded and armed the group in what might have been a serious geopolitical miscalculation motivated by the fact that both the Saudis and ISIS share the same sectarian disposition.

This is not to say that all (or even most) Sunni Muslims support ISIS or the Saudi monarchy, but it is to say this is where things get a little more detailed, and a lot more complicated.

Following the Sunni-Shia divide, and as was stated above, there were further subdivisions and the development of sub-sects of either a Sunni or Shia origin, most of which differed quite radically from either main sect in their own unique ways. One particular sub-sect of Sunni Islam which spread with popular ferocity throughout the Arab world was the literalist, puritanical (and fundamentalist) interpretation of Sunni doctrine known as Wahhabism. Though I will refrain from delving into the history of Wahhabism in itself, it is important to understand the ultraconservatism of the movement in the proper context.

Saudi Arabia—an American ally boasting massive oil reserves and a repressive absolute monarchy—is a Wahhabi Sunni state. Its medieval ultraconservatism has made it one of the most profoundly backwards countries in the modern world, being one of the last places where women cannot drive and must wear full-body veils by law. It is also the only place on Earth that beheads people suspected of witchcraft or so-called 'black magic.' During the period in which ISIS was beheading Western hostages such as American journalist James Foley and British humanitarian aid worker David Haines, Saudi Arabia beheaded at least 22 people in August 2014 alone. This, however, is a conservative estimate. As surprising as it may seem for those who have noted the Saudi's to be a loyal American ally, the Saudi Arabian government is exactly the same as ISIS in its nuanced interpretation of Islamic doctrine. Whether the Saudis were funding and/or arming the group in its early years—back when it was al-Qaeda in Iraq and fighting the American occupation—is a curious thought to entertain, as it would point to a utilitarian power politics on the part of the Saudis in which they felt impelled to fund insurgents hell-bent on annihilating the armed forces of Saudi Arabia's closest international ally. This, however, is simply a consideration on my part and is neither substantiated, nor even outwardly claimed. I've only posited it as a possibility due to a similar geopolitical miscalculation made on the part of the Pakistani ISI (Inter-Services Intelligence) when they helped to found the Afghan Taliban in 1994 under the direct command of then-Interior Minister Nasrullah Barbar, only ceasing military and financial support after the attacks of September 11^th, 2001. However, it has been alleged this support did not in fact end at all; new allegations sprung up following the death of Osama bin Laden as to how and why the al-Qaeda leader was able to live in a fortified compound in the city of Abbottabad under the nose of the Pakistani government—though I'm going to stop this thought here, as it has no bearing on an understanding of the war in Syria.

Earlier on, I mentioned how one could almost schematize who is on which side by dividing them into their own sectarian camps. The emphasis on almost should be explained, as the situation is comprised of many more shades of grey than pitch black or bright white, and just because someone identifies as Sunni or Shia doesn't mean you can safely assume where their allegiances lie. Muslim society is as diverse and kaleidoscopic as society in the West—possibly moreso, in certain respects—and there are bands of Sunni militants who have sworn allegiance to Assad's government whom are actively battling to defeat the revolution. Even the Vice President of Assad's administration, Farouk al-Sharaa, is of a Sunni persuasion, though he is far from being the 'exception to the rule,' as both the foreign minister as well as the head of the National Security Bureau are also Sunni. This leads directly into the next important point in our search to understand the war in Syria: the standing government—regardless of each individual members personal religious persuasion—has been secular in its operative nature since the rise of Hafez al-Assad in 1970. Though it has used the toolbox of blind orthodoxy to leverage a deified persona of the Assad dynasty in the eyes of common Syrians, neither Bashar nor his father designed their agendas from a sectarian standpoint.

In fact, both leaders worked from within the framework of their Ba'athist ideology, which—though ruthless—has always been an entirely secular movement based on Arab nationalism as opposed to any sort of political affinity with Islam. This hasn't stopped sectarianism from poking its ugly head out of the dirt, however, as even the secular Assad dynasty has had to deal with the implied criticism of being a direct part of a powerful minority and all the complicated social issues this entails. The Syrian Civil war—though mostly affected by deeply-rooted sectarian tensions—has only become a religious war due to the Islamist nature of many rebel groups (such as Al-Nusra, the Islamic Front, Ajnad al-Sham, the Army of the Mujahideen, Hezbollah, and—obviously—ISIS, to name only a few). The irrational universalism of these Islamist revolts has led to many inter-rebel conflicts, stalling the formation of a rebel coalition and granting Assad the leeway with which to slowly degrade opposition to his regime.

It may help here to describe the political worldview of Islam in order to effectively illustrate why the war has essentially ground into a perpetual (seemingly unbreakable) stalemate. But before we do so, one important distinction needs to be made between Islam as a personal or group religion, and Islamism, the interpretive adaptation of Muslim religious principles into a theory upon which to politically order societies and ideally (as will be discussed) the entire world.

Islamism carries itself on the central dualism of Dar al-Islam (literally, 'house of Islam'), and Dar al-Harb (house of war, or—as translated from the slightly alternative “Dar al-Garb”—it can quite literally mean 'house of the West'). The Dar al-Islam exists in a state of constant tension with the Dar al-Harb, and the posited destiny of the former is to overcome the latter and establish the House of Islam as the universal operating system across the entirety of the globe. What's striking about such a concept is that neither Dar al-Islam nor Dar al-Harb are ever mentioned in the Quaran; as well, one must think of 'Islamism' as a term as diverse as its purely religious parallel terminology, Islam. There are multiple forms it has taken as a political ideology, some considerably looser than others, though the militaristic Islamism we are now referring to—as in the Islamism inherent to most actors in the Syrian conflict—is, indeed, the dualism between Dar al-Harb and Dar al-Islam.

The bipolarity of such a worldview posits that what is within the realm of Islam (Dar al-Islam) is in an eternal state of hot and cold warfare with the realms beyond Islam's current sphere of control (the Dar al-Harb).

PLEASE NOTE: 

THIS IS STILL A WORK IN PROGRESS